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Abstract 
 
The definition and classification of modality has been paid much 
attention in the literature (Lyons 1977, Palmer 1986, Coates 1983, 
Sweetser 1990, Bybee et al. 1994, etc.) and, although scholars do 
not agree as for a single classification, they do coincide in the 
recognition of necessity and possibility as the two basic modal 
meanings. It is the relation between these meanings that 
constitutes the main concern in this study. From Lyons (1977) 
onwards, the logical relations between necessity and possibility 
have been taken for granted: ‘if X is not possible, not-X is 
necessary, and if X is not necessary, not-X is possible’. These 
relations establish that one of the meanings may develop from 
the other. While Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) claim that 
such a development may be bidirectional, i.e. necessity may stem 
from possibility and possibility may stem from necessity, 
Traugott and Dasher (2002) claim that only necessity can stem 
from possibility. In this scenario, this paper aims at 1) finding 
empirical evidence for the logical relations between necessity and 
possibility, and 2) confirming whether the development of these 
meanings is bidirectional or not. The empirical support consists 
of the analysis of German modal verb dürfen (as found in Van der 
Auwera and Plungian, 1998) and English tharf (<OE þurfan) and 
need, as found in a 2.4 million-word corpus, comprising the 
Helsinki Corpus, the Dictionary of Old English Corpus and the Corpus 
of Middle English Prose and Verse (from the Middle English 
Compendium). 
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1. Introduction: Modality and its types 
 
Modality is a semantic category that refers to the speaker’s 
judgement of their proposition, according to its truth or falsehood, its 
probability, etc. In Halliday’s (1970: 335) words: “a form of 
participation by the speaker in the speech event. Through modality, the 
speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity 
in his own judgement; he intrudes and takes up a position”. 
Different types of modality have been identified by different 
scholars, their number varying from two, i.e. root and epistemic (e.g. 
Coates, 1983; Sweetser, 1990; Talmy, 2000), to three, i.e. deontic, 
dynamic, epistemic (e.g. Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1979; 1986; 2003) or 
even four (cf. Bybee et al., 1994). Therefore, there is a lot of indecision 
and disagreement as for the types of modality that can be identified 
cross-linguistically. However, irrespectively of the classification 
adopted, what seems to be constant in all approaches is the division of 
modal meanings as related to necessity and possibility. 
It is precisely the relationship between necessity and possibility 
that constitute the core of this study. Therefore, section 2 describes the 
interrelation between the two basic modal meanings from a theoretical, 
logical point of view, following Palmer (1979, 1986, 2003). In sections 3 
and 4 I provide empirical evidence for this relationship, based on 
evidence from Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) and the findings in 
a 2.4 million-word corpus comprising the Helsinki Corpus (compiled by 
Rissanen et al., 1991), the Dictionary of Old English Corpus (compiled by 
diPaolo et al., 2000) and the Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse (as 
found in the Middle English Compendium). Thus, on the one hand, I relate 
the evolution of German modal dürfen to that of English pre-modal tharf 
(< Old English, OE, þurfan), and, on the other hand, I compare the 
development of English tharf to that of English need, which is claimed to 
be its semantic-syntactic substitute. Finally, section 5 summarizes the 
main conclusions. 
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2. Necessity and possibility as basic modal meanings 
 
Palmer (1979, 1986, 2003), as mentioned, recognizes three 
types of modality: epistemic, deontic and dynamic. Epistemic modality 
is “solely concerned with the speaker’s attitude to the status of the 
proposition,” and the other two are related “directly to the potentiality 
of the event signalled by the proposition” (Palmer, 2003: 7). More 
specifically, deontic modality is concerned with external circumstances 
and dynamic modality with internal ones. He obtains this classification 
stemming from the basic meanings of possibility and necessity, as seen 
in Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Types of modality and modal meanings stemming from the 
basic notions of necessity and possibility. 
 
 
 
DEONTIC 
 
EPISTEMIC DYNAMIC 
NECESSITY Obligation- 
exemption 
Deduction 
(inferred certainty, 
logical necessity) 
Desire, volition, 
necessity 
POSSIBILITY Permission- 
prohibition  
Possibility, 
probability 
Ability 
 
This table clarifies Palmer’s classification of modality. Stemming from 
the basic meanings of necessity and possibility, and filtering them 
through modality, we obtain a variety of meanings ranging from 
obligation to ability. 
Following the tradition of modal logic presented by von 
Wright (1951) and Lyons (1977), Palmer describes the logical relation 
between possibility and necessity, which implies that 
if X is not possible, then not-X is necessary and, consequently 
 if X is not necessary, then not-X is possible. 
In other words, if raining is not possible, not raining is necessary. 
Following the logical relations established between possibility and 
necessity, we can formulate what is implied in the following figure: 
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Figure 1. Logical relations between necessity and possibility. 
 
‘not possible’  ‘necessary not’ 
‘not necessary’   ‘possible not’ 
  
According to Palmer, this formula explains the relation 
between the two kinds of meanings conveyed by each type of modality, 
obligation and permission (deontic modality), deduction and probability 
(epistemic modality), and desire and ability (dynamic modality), as seen 
in Table 1 above. 
 Since the logical relations between necessity and possibility do 
not presuppose any directionality, Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) 
consider that the relation is bidirectional. Traugott and Dasher (2002: 
120-121), on the contrary, claim that verbs conveying possibility may 
end up expressing necessity, but never the other way round. With the 
aim of testing these two positions, in the following empirical sections I 
study the development of German dürfen and English tharf (< OE 
þurfan) and need. 
 
 
3. English tharf and German dürfen 
 
OE þurfan (and Middle English, ME, thurven, for that matter) is 
a preterite-present verb meaning ‘need,’ and, paradoxically, it is a 
cognate to the Present-Day German verb dürfen meaning ‘be allowed,’ 
(as in Darf ich die Tür aufmachen?, ‘Can I open the door?’). That is, the 
English verb expresses necessity and the German cognate expresses 
possibility. We may wonder what the original Germanic meaning was, 
and, according to Traugott and Dasher’s claim, we are likely to think 
that the expression of possibility preceded the expression of necessity. 
However, as seen in the following paragraphs, this is not so. 
The evolution of German dürfen has been accounted for by Van 
der Auwera and Plungian (1998). It originated as a polarized necessity 
modal conveying negative necessity (namely ‘need not’). Later it 
acquired a negative possibility meaning (namely ‘cannot,’ from an 
original necessity not to, i.e. ‘must not’), and finally it developed the 
current positive possibility meaning ‘may, to be allowed’ (cf. Van der 
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Auwera and Plungian, 1998: 99). Therefore, the evolution of dürfen may 
be sketched as in figure 2: 
 
Figure 2. Semantic evolution of German dürfen. 
 
‘need’ > ‘need not’ / ‘must not’ > ‘may not’ > ‘may’ 
 
According to this line of development, the meaning of 
possibility would stem from necessity, contravening Traugott and 
Dasher’s (2002) claim. This could be considered a single exception to 
the rule they formulate, but the truth is that within the history of 
English we find similar semantic developments. 
In fact, English tharf (<OE þurfan / ME thurven) is primarily a 
necessity verb, meaning ‘need’ and, most frequently ‘need not’, since it 
used to be constrained to non-affirmative contexts in the same way as 
PDE modal need. I have studied a 2.4 million word corpus comprising 
Old and Middle English and found that tharf, indeed, expresses 
necessity meanings in 209 out of the 214 occasions in which it is 
recorded, as seen in Table 2: 
 
Table 2. Possibility and necessity meanings found with OE þurfan and 
ME thurven. 
 
 OE 
(-1150) 
M1 
(1150-
1250) 
M2 
(1250-
1350) 
M3 
(1350-
1420) 
M42 
(1420-
1500) 
TOTAL 
POSSIBILITY 1 3 1   5 
NECESSITY 158 28 6 7 10 209 
TOTAL 159 31 7 7 10 214 
 
In the remaining 5 instances, its meaning is one of possibility, 
or rather impossibility, since they occur in non-affirmative contexts. In 
(late) Old English, I only find one example, which is (1): 
 
                                                 
2 The periodization followed is that proposed in the Helsinki Corpus. No division has 
been made as for Old English, because no significant differences have been observed in 
the different subperiods. 
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(1) Þurh  soþe bireousunge þeo soule  reste  onfoþ.   Ac  ne  þearf ic nefre    resten  
THROUGH TRUE  MERCY   THE SOUL   REST BEGINS BUT NOT 
NEED  I NEVER  REST 
þurh    þine  bireousunge, ac   altogædere    ic am forloren    þurh    þine luþere  
THROUGH YOUR MERCY   BUT ALTOGETHER  I AM DESTROYED 
THROUGH YOUR WICKED  
deden. 
DEEDS 
Through true mercy the rest of the soul begins. But I cannot ever rest through 
your mercy, but altogether I am destroyed by your wicked deeds. (HomU 5.6 
(Buch F) 13) 
 
In M1 (1150-1250), I find three examples, and in M2 (1250-1350) I find 
only one. This higher ratio of examples of tharf conveying possibility 
(or, rather, impossibility) in Middle English was somewhat expected, 
because the MED (s.v. thurven v. 7a) already records it. At this point, a 
word is in order as for thurven. In Middle English, this verb is often 
confused with durren (> PDE dare), which is a modal of possibility. 
Therefore, it might seem that the instances of thurven expressing 
possibility could be interpreted as a result of the coalescence of these 
two verbs. This could indeed be the case in one of the ME examples in 
my corpus. Consider (2): 
 
(2) he   wax so   mylde  and    so meke, 
 HE WAS SO MILD  AND  SO MEEK 
A mylder      man   þurt    no   man seke. 
A MILDER  MAN COULD NO MAN SEEK 
he grew so mild and so gentle, no one could seek a milder man. (6,024 
helsinki\cmhansyn) 
 
In this instance, the morphology exhibited by thurven seems to be 
influenced by that of durren, and the meaning of the whole sentence 
could be “he grew so mild and so gentle, no one dared seek a milder 
man.” However, in the remaining examples of ME thurven expressing 
possibility, its morphology is not affected by that of durren at all, as in 
(3), for instance: 
 
(3) 4172    Nu    is Iulius     awei ifloen; (...) 
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NOW IS JULIUS AWAY FLED 
4174     ne      þurfe we   nu     nauer-mare;       iseon hine  cumen here. 
NOT CAN    WE NOW NEVER-MORE SEE  HIM COME HERE 
Now Julius has fled (...) we cannot (will not have the occasion to) see 
him come here any more. (1205 Layamon’s Brut, lines 4172-4174) 
 
These three examples show that English tharf could indeed 
express impossibility, rather than necessity both in Old and Middle 
English. Although the expression of possibility may seem somewhat 
marginal in tharf, we must not disregard these data. Quite on the 
contrary, we can place them in a figure similar to that accounting for 
the evolution of German dürfen, because English tharf may also have 
developed the possibility meaning through the expression of 
prohibition, a meaning found from Old English, as in (4): 
 
(4) Ne þearf     nan man      þæs    wænan,     þæt     hyne        ænig man 
NO NEED (3 SG.)  NO MAN (NOM.) THAT BELIEVE THAT HIM (ACC.) 
ANY MAN (NOM.) 
mæge  alysan fram helle                wite. 
MAY  FREE  FROM HELL (GEN.) TORTURE (ACC.) 
no man must think that he may free himself from the torture of hell. (588 
helsinki\coepihom) 
 
Therefore, the evolution of tharf may be represented as in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Semantic evolution of English tharf. 
 
‘need’ > ‘need not’ > ‘must not’ > ‘cannot’ 
  
The parallel developments of German dürfen and English tharf 
constitute a double piece of evidence against Traugott and Dasher’s 
(2000: 120-121) claim that in the relationships between necessity and 
possibility, the former derives from the latter, and never the other way 
round. Quite on the contrary, the relationships between the modal 
notions of necessity and possibility seem to be bi-directional as 
formulated by Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998). 
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4. The case of tharf contrasted to need: parallel semantic 
development 
 
The similar development of English tharf and German dürfen 
would be nothing but anecdotal or restricted to this Germanic 
preterite-present verb, were it not for the fact that in ME neden (which 
gave way to PDE need) I observe a parallel phenomenon. This is highly 
interesting because this development is observed in no other necessity 
verb in the history of English (cf. Loureiro-Porto, 2005). Consider 
Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Possibility and necessity meanings found with OE neodian 
and ME neden.3 
 
 OE 
(-1150) 
M1 
(1150-
1250) 
M2 
(1250-
1350) 
M3 
(1350-
1420) 
M4 
(1420-
1500) 
TOTAL 
POSSIBILITY     3 3 
NECESSITY 1 2 0 72 69 144 
TOTAL 1 2 0 72 72 147 
 
Table 3 shows that this weak verb, which was marginal in Old 
English, gains an increase in frequency that leads it to its PDE status in 
late Middle English (from 1350 onwards). In fact, most of the 147 
examples of this verb in my corpus occur after 1350. Although the 
MED (s.v. neden v.2) only account for necessity nuances, in subperiod 
M4 (1420-1500) I find three sentences in which the meaning of need 
cannot be deciphered without resorting to the notion of possibility. 
One of them is (5): 
 
(5) These  dide merveilously   wele,  and  so dide  Sir Ewein,  that   a better knyght 
THESE  DID MARVELLOUSLY WELL   AND SO DID   SIR EWEIN  THAT 
A BETTER KNIGHT 
                                                 
3 These results account only for need v.2 (cf. OED s.v. need v.2), whose primary meaning 
is ‘be necessary, need,’ and, therefore, they exclude need v.1 ‘force, compel.’ Although 
the relationship between these two verbs has proved them inseparable when other 
aspects are taken into account (cf. Loureiro-Porto, forthcoming), for the purposes of 
this paper, I will keep them apart. 
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than     he neded       no man    to  be-holde. 
THAN HE NEEDED NO MAN TO BEHOLD 
These did marvellously well, and so did Sir Ewein, that no man could behold a 
better knight than him. (1450-1460 Merlin) 
 
This is one of the three examples in which neden v.2 expresses 
the existence of a barrier. The context is similar to those of ME thurven, 
mentioned above, and illustrated with sentence (2), because in both 
cases the verb follows a comparative adjective in order to imply that 
there cannot be anything better than what is being described. All three 
examples in my corpus belong to the text Merlin and, therefore they 
may be considered to be influenced by factors such as the idiolect or 
the dialect of the author. Be it as it may, the fact that need may convey 
(im)possibility is the third piece of evidence which corroborates that 
possibility can develop out of necessity, as claimed by Van der Auwera 
and Plungian (1998: 97 ff.), and contrary to Traugott and Dasher’s 
(2002: 120-121) assertion that only necessity develops from possibility 
and not vice versa. Thus, we have seen that not only the preterite-
presents dürfen (in German) and tharf (in English) develop possibility 
meanings from necessity, but also need does, which goes back to a 
lexical weak OE verb. 
It is interesting to note that tharf and need share not only the 
unexpected ability to express possibility, but they are also the only verbs 
meaning ‘need’ in the history of English that reach a somewhat 
auxiliary status through a process of grammaticalization (in Old and 
early Modern English respectively; cf. Warner, 1993 and Barber, 1997 
[1976], for instance). In fact, need is often considered to be the PDE 
equivalent to OE þurfan (cf., for instance, Denison, 1993: 295). As 
shown in Loureiro-Porto (2005), no other verb meaning ‘need’ 
develops possibility nuances or undergoes grammaticalization. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the capacity to oscillate between the 
notions of necessity and possibility appears to be a feature of 
auxiliaries, something which is also corroborated by the above-
mentioned example of German dürfen, the cognate of tharf. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The description of the logical relations between necessity and 
possibility, together with the empirical analysis of German dürfen and 
English tharf and need allow us to formulate some interesting 
conclusions: 
 
a. The notions of necessity and possibility are more tightly related 
than it might seem at first sight, since, on the one hand, they 
are intimately linked in the world of logic, and, on the other 
hand, they are found to coexist in the history of modal verbs in 
both German and English. 
b. Contravening Traugott and Dasher’s (2002: 120-121) claim that 
only necessity can stem from possibility, and confirming Van 
der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998) statement, I have proved 
that possibility can indeed stem from necessity, as seen in the 
evolution of German dürfen and English tharf and need. 
c. The ability to transfer from necessity to possibility seems to be 
restricted to verbs that are bound to undergo 
grammaticalization, since this development is only observed in 
verbs that reach a somewhat auxiliary status in different 
periods of the language. 
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